





JURISPRUDENCE ON JCE – REVISITING A NEVER 
ENDING STORY ABOUT A JUDGE MADE MODE 
OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY BEFORE SOME 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper intends to demonstrate that the doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise 
(aka JCE, an abbreviation not intended to mean “Just Convict Everyone” as in-
terpreted by some scholars1) is an unnecessary and even dangerous attempt to 
describe a mode of liability not foreseen in the Statutes of today’s international 
tribunals, in particular not in the Statutes of ICTY2 and ICTR3, however invented 
and applied by the Appeal Chamber of both Tribunals. This artefact has all the 
potential of violating in part the fundamental right not to be punished without 
law (nullum crimen, nulla poena, sine lege). This potential risk unfortunately 
has realized itself for the Þ rst time ever before the SC/SL4 as will be shown 
below. First the deÞ nition as developed before ICTY, and later ICTR, shall be 
described. This will be done by summarizing the jurisprudence of both ICTY 
and ICTR, including inherent criticism and dissenting opinions. On purpose, the 
deluge of efforts to support or to annihilate this doctrine by academics will be 
ignored. These secondary sources could serve rather for confusion. The only au-
thentic account of this doctrine is the chain of judgments, interlocutory decisions 
and dissenting opinions. When criticizing the majority’s opinion of the Appeal 
Chambers of ICTY and ICTR, I will mainly refer to my own dissenting opinions, 
in order not to invent the wheel twice. This method at the same time allows me 
to avoid to comment on own decisions and opinions. SpeciÞ c reference will be 
made to the Stakiþ Trial Judgment5 that should be seen as a separate opinion to 
the main-stream jurisprudence and can be seen even as a dissenting opinion to 
∗  Former permanent judge (2001 - 2008) of ICTY/ICTR. Former judge of the German Federal 
Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof). Contactable: schomburg@fps-law.de. Copyright retained by 
the author.
1  Cf. e.g. Badar, M. E. „Just Convict Everyone!“ – Joint Perpetration: From Tadiþ to Stakiþ and 
Back Again, 6 International Criminal Law Review (2006), pp.293 et seq.
2  International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
3  International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
4  Special Court for Sierra Leone.
5  Prosecutor v. Stakiþ (Trial Judgment) IT-97-24-T (31 July 2003).
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it. The Stakiþ Trial Bench was composed of judges from Civil Law countries (a 
judge from Argentina, replacing a judge from Morocco, when it came to start the 
defence case, and judges from Ukraine and Germany). This Trial Judgment was 
an attempt by all judges acting in concert to harmonise the already established 
jurisprudence with modes of liability established in their home countries and, 
most importantly, the law applicable in the former Yugoslavia and today in the 
new countries on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. (Let me pause here for 
a split of a second and turn to an issue forming not directly part of this article, 
being however of serious concern also in this context. No doubt, international 
criminal law is a law sui generis. However, what about acceptance and respect 
vis-à-vis the domestic law in the areas of the tribunals’ responsibility? It has 
been already a fundamental mistake to impose Anglo-American procedural law 
into areas of responsibility (Yugoslavia/Rwanda) not acquainted with this totally 
different approach in terms of truth-Þ nding and understanding for the people 
concerned.) This general remark also holds true for the applicable substantive 
law, here the general part of it. Why was it necessary at all to again impose a new 
doctrine (JCE), absolutely unknown in both areas of responsibility, this even in 
light of the broad scope of Article 15 ICCPR, a topic which cannot be discussed 
here in greater detail? Why unnecessarily run the risk of infringing in an addi-
tional way the principle of nullum crimen, sine lege praevia, when comparing 
the jurisprudence of both ad hoc-tribunals with the law applicable in both areas 
of responsibility? The need to depart from the latter had arisen only when the 
domestic law was able or even intended to shelter the most senior responsible 
ones from criminal responsibility. For me it is abundantly clear that on the con-
trary the general part of the applicable domestic law in both areas was even better 
placed to accomplish the necessary:
a)  in general: to bring to justice without legal gaps and effectively the most seri-
ous actors in campaigns of genocide and ethnical cleansing;
b)  to hold responsible the perpetrators behind the perpetrators, the allegedly un-
touchables;
c)  not to run the risk that those perpetrators with clean hands escape as mere aiders 
and abettors (a trivialization realized in later judgments of ICTY/ICTR);
d)  not to confuse the membership in a JCE with a membership in a criminal 
group, the latter forming a separate broader (and thus least grave) mode of 
participation6, not foreseen in the Statutes of the UN ad hoc-tribunals, how-
ever in the Rome Statute for the permanent ICC (Art. 25(3)(d):an additional 
argumentum e contrario);
e)  not to run the risk that, exactly opposed to the primary goal of International 
Criminal Law, members of groups, or ethnicities would be punished solely 
based on a common purpose or intent, i.e. nearly every likeminded person.
6  Cf. Werle, G., Principles of International Criminal Law, The Hague, 2006 para. 493 at p. 184.
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This paper will show that in particular the third category of JCE has no basis 
in both the Statutes of ICTY and ICTR.7 The principle of nullum crimen, nulla 
poena, sine lege stricta forbids the application of the JCE doctrine at least in its 
third category against the clear wording of both Statutes. From the outset it has 
to be pointed out that in principle the Þ rst and the second category of JCE will 
not be discussed in greater detail as these categories by and large overlap with 
traditional deÞ nitions of the term “committing”. As regards these two categories 
it was only a unnecessary academic game Þ rst to invent a new doctrine and than 
to subsume this doctrine under one of liability, explicitly foreseen in the Statute. 
A waste of time and human resources for the ad hoc Tribunals. A nice but mis-
leading challenge for academics.
It is primarily the third category that in its broadness and vagueness infringes 
the principle of nullum crimen, nulla poena, sine lege stricta. It is only the third 
category that takes issue with the fundamental basis of International Humanitar-
ian Law, in that “[c]rimes against international law are committed by men, not by 
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can 
the provisions of international law be enforced”8. It is again the principle of indi-
vidual guilt to criminalize the mens rea of a person without an exhaustively and 
precisely described actus reus. In short, the mere membership e.g. in an ethnical 
group can never be punished. The membership in a criminal group is, opposed 
to the law of many countries9 or, more importantly, the Statute of the ICC10, not 
punishable under the Statutes of ICTY and ICTR. However, the striking similar-
ity to the concept of JCE should have served as a warning. The paper will dem-
onstrate that reference to a mode of liability not foreseen in the Statutes was not 
necessary to establish a criminal liability of in particular the most serious offend-
ers in macro criminality. The paper will discuss that in International Criminal 
7  Article 7 ICTY Statute, Article 6 ICTR Statute.
8  Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 1949, 
p. 223.
9  See, e.g. § 129 (1) German Criminal Code which reads as follows: “Whosoever forms an or-
ganisation the aims or activities of which are directed at the commission of offences or whosoever 
participates in such an organisation as a member, recruits members or supporters for it or supports 
it, shall be liable to imprisonment of not more than Þ ve years or a Þ ne.”
10  Article 25(3)d of ICC-Statute which reads as follows: “In accordance with this Statute, a person 
shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court if that person: […] (d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted com-
mission of such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution 
shall be intentional and shall either: (i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or 
criminal purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court; or (ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group 
to commit the crime[.]” This norm, however, regulates a new form of participation. It does not deal 
with a form of perpetration, but constitutes the broadest, and the least grave, mode of participation 
(cf. Werle, G., Principles of International Criminal Law, 2nd ed., The Hague, 2009, at para. 493).
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Law there can be only one exhaustive enumeration of modes of liability. For this 
purpose, by contrast, also jurisprudence of ICC11, SC/SL12, and most recently of 
ECCC13 has brieß y to be revisited. In its conclusion the paper will Þ nally discuss 
the most preferable general part of criminal law dealing with modes of criminal 
liability. Having discussed this, the ß oor may be open to recommendations by 
academics how best to develop an entirely new (or for the Þ rst time ever) general 
part of substantive criminal law for the future of this unalienable part of justice: 
International Criminal Justice.
2. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF ICTY AND ICTR FROM TADIý TO SE-
ROMBA
Now it is time to give the ß oor to judges and benches. (The authors minimal-
istic comments will be found in Italics; additional emphasises will be added by 
underlining) Focussing exclusively on the jurisprudence this chapter shall show 
the development of JCE from its invention in Tadiþ14 for unknown reasons based 
on some out singled judgments of the past only, via Ojdaniþ15, limiting JCE to a 
deÞ nition of “committing”, and Þ nally Seromba16, an Appeals Judgment that in 
essence without saying embarked on the objective limitation by the criterion of 
Tatherrschaft (control over the act).17Let us now start with 
1) Prosecutor v. Tadiþ (Appeal Judgement) IT-94-1 (15 July 1999), paras 192, 
201, 220, 227-228, inventing three categories of JCE.18 Before doing so, it has to 
be recalled what exactly is punishable in accordance with Article 7(1) ICTY Stat-
ute and Article 6(1) ICTR Statute. They have in common the following wording 
which must be the point of departure as it is strictly binding the judges:
11  International Criminal Court, in: The Prosecutor v. Lubanga (Pre-Trial Chamber Decision on 
the ConÞ rmation of Charges) ICC-01/04-01/06 (29 January 2007), The Prosecutor v. Katanga et 
al. (Pre-Trial Chamber Decision on the ConÞ rmation of Charges) ICC-01/04-01/07 (30 September 
2008), The Prosecutor v. Bemba (Pre-Trial Chamber Decision on the ConÞ rmation of Charges) 
ICC-01/05-01/08 (15 June 2009).
12  Special Court for Sierra Leone, in: Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao (Appeal Judgment), 
SCSL-04-15-A (26 October 2009).
13  Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, in: Order on the Application at the ECC 
of the Form of Liability Known as Joint Criminal Enterprise, OfÞ ce of the Co-Investigating Judge, 
Case File No.: 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ (8 December 2009). (Appeal pending at the time this 
article was Þ nalized).
14  Prosecutor v. Tadiþ (Appeal Judgment) IT-94-1 (15 July 1999).
15  Prosecutor v. Milutinoviþ et al. (Decision on Draguljub Ojdaniþ’s Motion Challenging Jurisdic-
tion – Joint Criminal Enterprise) IT-99-37-AR72 (21 May 2003).
16  The Prosecutor v. Seromba (Appeal Judgment) ICTR-2001-66-A (12 March 2008).
17  Ibid. at, paras. 171-174.
18  Prosecutor v. Tadiþ (Appeal Judgement) IT-94-1 (15 July 1999), paras 185-229.
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“A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and 
abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 
[…] of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the crime.”
Sorry to pause and comment again: It has to be recalled that Tadiþ had already 
been accused by the German federal prosecutor (Generalbundesanwalt) and the 
case was ready for the hearing before a court in Munich when primacy was 
exercised by ICTY, thus the case had to be transferred to The Hague on 12 No-
vember/8 October 1994.19 In Germany he was accused for having “committed” 
crimes based on a strong degree of suspicion as it would have been in former 
Yugoslavia. Why translate this into JCE? In light of this it can be reasonably 
assumed that some judges felt obliged to lay down what they always wanted to 
express without necessity in fact or law. This has to be called what it was: an 
obiter dictum as it had no impact on the outcome of the case at hand. 
The judgment starts precisely to the point at on Art. 192-201: 
“192. Under these circumstances, to hold criminally liable as a perpetrator only 
the person who materially performs the criminal act would disregard the role as 
co- perpetrators of all those who in some way made it possible for the perpetrator 
physically to carry out that criminal act. At the same time, depending upon the 
circumstances, to hold the latter liable only as aiders and abettors might under-
state the degree of their criminal responsibility.”...
“201. It should be noted that in many post-World War II trials held in other coun-
tries, courts took the same approach to instances of crimes in which two or more 
persons participated with a different degree of involvement. However, they did 
not rely upon the notion of common purpose or common design, preferring to 
refer instead to the notion of co-perpetration. This applies in particular to Ital-
ian24620 and German24721 cases.”
Comment: However, continuing unfortunately at para.
19  Cf. Schomburg, W., and Nemitz, J. in: Schomburg et.al., Internationale Rechtshilfe in Straf-
sachen, 4th ed., Munich 2006, VI,A,3 para 27 at p. 1747.
20  See for instance the following decisions of the Italian Court of Cassation relating to crimes 
committed by militias or forces of the “Repubblica Sociale Italiana” against Italian partisans or 
armed forces: Annalberti et al., 18 June 1949, in Giustizia penale 1949, Part II, col. 732, no. 440; 
Rigardo et al. case, 6 July 1949, ibid., cols. 733 and 735, no. 443; P.M. v. Castoldi, 11 July 1949, 
ibid., no. 444; Imolesi et al., 5 May 1949, ibid., col. 734, no. 445. See also Ballestra, 6 July 1949, 
ibid., cols. 732-733, no. 442.
21  See for instance the decision of 10 August 1948 of the German Supreme Court for the British 
Zone in K. and A., in Entscheidungen des Obersten Gerichtshofes für die Britische Zone in Straf-
sachen, vol. I, pp. 53-56; the decision of 22 February 1949 in J. and A., ibid., pp. 310-315; the 
decision of the District Court (Landgericht) of Cologne of 22 and 23 January 1946 in Hessmer et 
al., in Justiz und NS-Verbrechen, vol. I, pp. 13-23, at pp. 13, 20; the decision of 21 December 1946 
of the District Court (Landgericht) of Frankfurt am Main in M. et al. (ibid., pp. 135-165, 154) and 
the judgement of the Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) of 12 August 1947 in the same case 
(ibid., pp. 166-186, 180); as well as the decision of the District Court of Braunschweig of 7 May 
1947 in Affeldt, ibid., p. 383-391, 389.
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“220. […] [T]he Appeals Chamber holds the view that the notion of common 
design as a form of accomplice liability is Þ rmly established in customary in-
ternational law and in addition is upheld, albeit implicitly [sic: no reasoning is 
given for this statement], in the Statute of the International Tribunal. As for the 
objective and subjective elements of the crime, the case law shows that the no-
tion has been applied to three distinct categories of cases. 
 First, in cases of co-perpetration, where all participants in the common design 
possess the same criminal intent to commit a crime (and one or more of them 
actually perpetrate the crime, with intent).  
Secondly, in the so-called “concentration camp” cases, where the requisite mens 
rea comprises knowledge of the nature of the system of ill-treatment and intent 
to further the common design of illtreatment. Such intent may be proved either 
directly or as a matter of inference from the nature of the accused’s authority 
within the camp or organisational hierarchy. 
With regard to the third category of cases, it is appropriate to apply the notion 
of “common purpose” only where the following requirements concerning mens 
rea are fulÞ lled: (i) the intention to take part in a joint criminal enterprise and to 
further – individually and jointly – the criminal purposes of that enterprise; and 
(ii) the foreseeability of the possible commission by other members of the group 
of offences that do not constitute the object of the common criminal purpose. 
Hence, the participants must have had in mind the intent, for instance, to ill-treat 
prisoners of war (even if such a plan arose extemporaneously) and one or some 
members of the group must have actually killed them. In order for responsibility 
for the deaths to be imputable to the others, however, everyone in the group must 
have been able to predict this result. It should be noted that more than negligence 
is required. What is required is a state of mind in which a person, although he did 
not intend to bring about a certain result, was aware that the actions of the group 
were most likely to lead to that result but nevertheless willingly took that risk. 
In other words, the so-called dolus eventualis is required (also called “advertent 
recklessness” in some national legal systems).”
The Appeals Chamber continues, at paras 227-229:
“227. In sum, the objective elements (actus reus) of this mode of participation 
in one of the crimes provided for in the Statute (with regard to each of the three 
categories of cases) are as follows:
i. A plurality of persons. They need not be organised in a military, political or 
administrative structure, as is clearly shown by the Essen Lynching22 and the 
Kurt Goebell23 cases.
22  Trial of Erich Heyer and six others, British Military Court for the Trial of War Criminals, Essen 
18th-19th and 21st-22nd December, 1945, UNWCC, vol. I, p. 88, at p. 91.
23  Also called the Borkum Island case. See, Charge Sheet, in U.S. National Archives MicroÞ lm 
Publications, I.
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ii. The existence of a common plan, design or purpose which amounts to or in-
volves the commission of a crime provided for in the Statute. There is no neces-
sity for this plan, design or purpose to have been previously arranged or formu-
lated. The common plan or purpose may materialise extemporaneously and be 
inferred from the fact that a plurality of persons acts in unison to put into effect 
a joint criminal enterprise. 
iii. Participation of the accused in the common design involving the perpetra-
tion of one of the crimes provided for in the Statute. This participation need not 
involve commission of a speciÞ c crime under one of those provisions (for exam-
ple, murder, extermination, torture, rape, etc.), but may take the form of assist-
ance in, or contribution to, the execution of the common plan or purpose.
228. By contrast, the mens rea element differs according to the category of com-
mon design under consideration.  
With regard to the Þ rst category, what is required is the intent to perpetrate a cer-
tain crime (this being the shared intent on the part of all co-perpetrators). 
With regard to the second category (which, as noted above, is really a variant of 
the Þ rst), personal knowledge of the system of ill-treatment is required (whether 
proved by express testimony or a matter of reasonable inference from the ac-
cused’s position of authority), as well as the intent to further this common con-
certed system of ill-treatment.  
With regard to the third category, what is required is the intention to participate 
in and further the criminal activity or the criminal purpose of a group and to 
contribute to the joint criminal enterprise or in any event to the commission of 
a crime by the group. In addition, responsibility for a crime other than the one 
agreed upon in the common plan arises only if, under the circumstances of the 
case, (i) it was foreseeable that such a crime might be perpetrated by one or other 
members of the group and (ii) the accused willingly took that risk.”
Comment: Unfortunately the last element has been at times ignored. Only in 
Blaškiþ24 and Kordiþ and ÿerkez25 it was clariÞ ed that to meet the standard of 
dolus eventualis the perpetrator must willingly accept or approve that risk. 
2) Prosecutor v. Milutinoviþ et al. (Decision on Draguljub Ojdaniþ’s Motion 
Challenging Jurisdiction – Joint Criminal Enterprise) IT-99-37-AR72 (21 May 
2003), paras. 18-20, limiting JCE to “committing”)
“18.  The appellant in this case has advanced no cogent reason why the Ap-
peals Chamber should come to a different conclusion than the one it reached 
in the Tadiþ case, namely, that joint criminal enterprise was provided for in the 
Statute of the Tribunal and that it existed under customary international law at 
the relevant  time. The Defence’s Þ rst contention is that the Appeals Chamber 
24  Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškiþ, Appeal Judgement, Case No. IT-95-14-A, of 29 July 2004
25  Prosecutor v. Dario Kordiþ and Mario ÿerkez , Appeal Judgement, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, of 
17 December 2004
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misinterpreted the drafters’ intention as, it claims, they would have referred to 
joint criminal enterprise explicitly had they intended to include such a form of 
liability within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. As pointed out above, the Statute of 
the International Tribunal sets the framework within which the Tribunal may ex-
ercise its jurisdiction. A crime or a form of liability which is  not provided for in 
the Statute could not form the basis of a conviction before this Tribunal.5526 The 
reference to that crime or to that form of liability does not need, however, to be 
explicit to come within the purview of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.5627 The Stat-
ute of the ICTY is not and does not purport to be, unlike for instance the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, a meticulously detailed code provid-
ing explicitly for every possible scenario and every solution thereto. It sets out 
in somewhat general terms the jurisdictional framework within which the Tribu-
nal has been mandated to operate.”
Comment: Do the two second to last sentences survive the test of nullum crimen 
sine lege stricta? 
“19. As noted in the Tadiþ Appeal Judgment, the Secretary-General’s Report pro-
vided that “all persons” who participate in the planning, preparation or execution 
of serious violations of international humanitarian law con tri bute to the commis-
sion of the violation and are therefore individually responsible.5728 Also, and on 
its face, the list in Article 7(l) appears to be non exhaustive in nature as the use 
of the phrase “or otherwise aided and abetted” suggests. But the Appeals Cham-
ber does not need to consider whether, outside those forms of liability expressly 
mentioned in the Statute, other forms of liability could come within Article 7(l). 
It is indeed satisÞ ed that joint criminal enterprise comes within the terms of that 
provision.”
Comment: Vicious circle or circle conclusion?
“20. In the present case, Ojdaniþ is charged as a co-perpetrator in a joint criminal 
enterprise the purpose of which was, inter alia, the expulsion of a substantial 
portion of the Kosovo Albanian population from the territory of  the province of 
Kosovo in an effort to ensure continued Serbian control over the province.5829 
The Prosecution pointed out in its indictment against Ojdaniþ that its use of the 
word “committed” was not intended to suggest that any of the accused physically 
perpetrated any of the crimes charged, personally. “Committing”, the Prosecu-
tion wrote, “refers to participation in a joint criminal enterprise as a co-perpetra-
tor”.5930 Leaving aside the appropriateness of the use of the expression “co-per-
26  Footnote omitted.
27  The Tribunal has accepted, for instance, that Article 3 of the Statute was a residual clause and 
that crimes which are not explicitly listed in Article 3 of the Statute could nevertheless form part 
of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction (ref to Tadiþ).
28  Tadiþ Appeal Judgment, par 190, citing Secretary-General’s Report, par 54.
29  Footnote omitted.
30  Indictment, par 16.
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petration” in such a context, it would seem therefore that the Prosecution charges 
co-perpetration in a joint criminal enterprise as a form of “commission” pursuant 
to Article 7(l) of the Statute, rather than as a form of accomplice liability. The 
Prosecution’s approach is correct to the extent that, insofar as a participant shares 
the purpose of the joint criminal enterprise (as he or she must do) as opposed to 
merely knowing about it, he or she cannot be regarded as a mere aider and abet-
tor to the crime  which is contemplated. The Appeals Chamber therefore regards 
joint criminal enterprise as a form of “commission” pursuant to Article 7(l) of 
the Statute. 31”
 
3) Prosecutor v. Stakiþ (Trial Judgement) IT-97-24-T (31 July 2003), paras 
437-442 in its unsuccessful attempt to make the best of it by joining JCE with 
stricter modes of liability...
 “437. The Trial Chamber notes with special reference to the mens rea of joint 
criminal enterprise that Article 7(1) lists modes of liability only. These can not 
change or replace elements of crimes deÞ ned in the Statute. In particular, the 
mens rea elements required for an offence listed in the Statute cannot be al-
tered.
438. The Trial Chamber emphasises that joint criminal enterprise is only one of 
several possible interpretations of the term “commission” under Article 7(1) of 
the Statute and that other deÞ nitions of co-perpetration must equally be taken 
into account. Furthermore, a more direct reference to “commission” in its tradi-
tional sense should be given priority before considering responsibility under the 
judicial term “joint criminal enterprise”.
439. The Trial Chamber prefers to deÞ ne ‘committing’ as meaning that the ac-
cused participated, physically or otherwise directly or indirectly,94232 in the ma-
terial elements of the crime charged through positive acts or, based on a duty to 
act, omissions, whether individually or jointly with others. 94333 The accused 
himself need not have participated in all aspects of the alleged criminal con-
duct.
440. In respect of the above deÞ nition of ‘committing’, the Trial Chamber con-
siders that a more detailed analysis of co-perpetration is necessary. For co-perpe-
tration it sufÞ ces that there was an explicit agreement or silent consent to reach 
a common goal by coordinated co-operation and joint control over the criminal 
conduct. For this kind of co-perpetration it is typical, but not mandatory, that 
one perpetrator possesses skills or authority which the other perpetrator does 
31  Emphasis added by the author.
32  Indirect participation in German Law (mittelbare Täterschaft) or “the perpetrator behind the 
perpetrator”; terms normally used in the context of white collar crime or other forms of organised 
crime.
33  KvoĀka Trial Judgement, para. 251.
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not. These can be described as shared acts which when brought together achieve 
the shared goal based on the same degree of control over the execution of the 
common acts. In the words of Roxin: “The coperpetrator can achieve nothing 
on his own…The plan only ‘works’ if the accomplice94434 works with the other 
person.”94535 Both perpetrators are thus in the same position. As Roxin explains, 
“they can only realise their plan insofar as they act together, but each individu-
ally can ruin the whole plan if he does not carry out his part. To this extent he 
is in control of the act.”94636 Roxin goes on to say, “[t]his type of ‘key position’ 
of each co-perpetrator describes precisely the structure of joint control over the 
act.”94737 Finally, he provides the following very typical example:
 If two people govern a country together - are joint rulers in the literal 
sense of the word - the usual consequence is that the acts of each depend 
on the co-perpetration of the other. The reverse side of this is, inevitably, 
the fact that by refusing to participate, each person individually can frus-
trate the action.94838
441. The Trial Chamber is aware that the end result of its deÞ nition of co-per-
petration approaches that of the aforementioned joint criminal enterprise and 
even overlaps in part. However, the Trial Chamber opines that this deÞ nition is 
closer to what most legal systems understand as “committing”94939 and avoids 
the misleading impression that a new crime95040 not foreseen in the Statute of 
this Tribunal has been introduced through the backdoor.95141
442. In respect of the mens rea, the Trial Chamber re-emphasises that modes 
of liability can not change or replace elements of crimes deÞ ned in the Statute 
and that the accused must also have acted in the awareness of the substantial 
likelihood that punishable conduct would occur as a consequence of coordinated 
co-operation based on the same degree of control over the execution of common 
acts. Furthermore, the accused must be aware that his own role is essential for 
the achievement of the common goal.”
4) The answer follows immediately in the Appeal Judgment (it has to be noted 
that no party had appealed the legal assessment of the Trial Chamber): Prosecu-
tor v. Stakiþ IT-97-24-A (22 March 2006), para. 62
34  In this context the term ‘accomplice’ is used interchangeably with ‘co-perpetrator’ (footnote 
added). See also Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 77.
35  Roxin, Claus, Täterschaft und Tatherrschaft (Perpetration and control over the act), 6th Edition, 
Berlin, New York, 1994, p. 278.
36  Ibid.
37  Ibid.
38  Ibid. p. 279
39  See supra Roxin as one example for the Civil Law approach. For the Common Law approach 
see: Sworth, Andrew, Principals of Criminal Law, 2nd Edition, Oxford 1995, p. 409 ff and Fletcher, 
George P., Rethinking Criminal Law, Oxford, 2000, p. 637ff.
40  E.g. “membership in a criminal organization”.
41  Defence Final Brief, paras 168, 170, and 178.
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“62. Upon a careful and thorough review of the relevant sections of the Trial 
Judgement, the Appeals Chamber Þ nds that the Trial Chamber erred in conduct-
ing its analysis of the responsibility of the Appellant within the framework of 
“co-perpetratorship”. This mode of liability, as deÞ ned and applied by the Trial 
Chamber, does not have support in customary international law or in the settled 
jurisprudence of this Tribunal, which is binding on the Trial Chambers. By way 
of contrast, joint criminal enterprise is a mode of liability which is “Þ rmly estab-
lished in customary international law”14842 and is routinely applied in the Tri-
bunal’s jurisprudence.14943 Furthermore, joint criminal enterprise is the mode of 
liability under which the Appellant was charged in the Indictment, and to which 
he responded at trial.15044 In view of these reasons, it appears that the Trial 
Chamber erred in employing a mode of liability which is not valid law within the 
jurisdiction of this Tribunal. This invalidates the decision of the Trial Chamber 
as to the mode of liability it employed in the Trial Judgement.”
5) The Prosecutor v. Seromba (Appeal Judgement) ICTR-2001-66-A (12 March 
2008), paras 171-172: Comment: Finally a silent convergence? 
“171. On the basis of these underlying factual Þ ndings, the Appeals Chamber 
Þ nds that Athanase Seromba approved and embraced as his own the decision 
of Kayishema, Ndahimana, Kanyarukiga, Habarugira, and other persons to de-
stroy the church in order to kill the Tutsi refugees. It is irrelevant that Athanase 
Seromba did not personally drive the bulldozer that destroyed the church. What 
is important is that Athanase Seromba fully exercised his inß uence over the bull-
dozer driver who, as the Trial Chamber’s Þ ndings demonstrate, accepted Atha-
nase Seromba as the only authority, and whose directions he followed. The Ap-
peals Chamber Þ nds, Judge Liu dissenting, that Athanase Seromba’s acts, which 
cannot be adequately described by any other mode of liability pursuant to Article 
6(1) of the Statute than “committing”, indeed were as much as an integral part 
of the crime of genocide as the killings of the Tutsi refugees.41145 Athanase Se-
romba was not merely an aidor and abettor but became a principal perpetrator in 
the crime itself.
172. The Appeals Chamber observes, Judge Liu dissenting, that Athanase Se-
romba’s conduct was not limited to giving practical assistance, encouragement 
or moral support to the principal perpetrators of the crime, which would merely 
42  Tadiþ Appeal Judgement, para. 220.
43  See KvoĀka Appeal Judgement, para. 79; Vasiljeviþ Appeal Judgement, para. 95; Krsti´c Ap-
peal Judgement, paras 79–134; Ojdaniþ Decision on Jurisdiction, paras 20, 43; Furundžija Appeal 
Judgement, para. 119; Krnojelac Appeal Judgement paras 29-32; CelebiþiAppeal Judgement, para. 
366; Tadiþ Appeal Judgement, para. 220, Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brāanin & Momir Taliþ, Case 
No: IT-99-36-PT, Decision on Form of Further Amended Indictment and Prosecution Application 
to Amend, 26 June 2001, para. 24; Babiþ Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, paras 27, 38, 40.
44  Footnote omitted.
45  Cf. Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, para. 60.
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constitute the actus reus of aiding and abetting.41246 Quite the contrary, the Þ nd-
ings of the Trial Chamber allow for only one conclusion, namely, that Athanase 
Seromba was a principal perpetrator in the killing of the refugees in Nyange 
church. The Appeals Chamber therefore Þ nds that Athanase Seromba’s conduct 
can only be characterized as “committing” these crimes.”
In his dissenting opinion attached to this judgment Judge Liu made exactly this 
point, later heavily applauded by some scholars of the Cassese-school: 
“8. Thirdly, it is widely recognized that in various legal systems, however, “com-
mitting” is interpreted differently such that co-perpetratorship and indirect per-
petratorship are also recognized as forms of “committing”.1547 Co-perpetrators 
pursue a common goal, either through an explicit agreement or silent consent, 
which they can only achieve by co-ordinated action and shared control over the 
criminal conduct. Each co-perpetrator must make a contribution essential to the 
commission of the crime.1648 Indirect perpetration on the other hand requires 
that the indirect perpetrator uses the direct and physical perpetrator as a mere 
“instrument” to achieve his goal, i.e., the commission of the crime. In such cases, 
the indirect perpetrator is criminally responsible because he exercises control 
over the act and the will of the direct and physical perpetrator.1749The Majority 
reasoned that “[i]t is irrelevant that Athanase Seromba did not personally drive 
the bulldozer that destroyed the church” in order to Þ nd Athanase Seromba re-
sponsible for committing genocide, and that, “[w]hat is important is that Atha-
nase Seromba fully exercised his inß uence over the bulldozer driver who, as the 
Trial Chamber’s Þ ndings demonstrate, accepted Athanase Seromba as the only 
authority, and whose directions he followed.”1850 Evident in this reasoning is the 
attribution of liability for “committing” to the “perpetrator behind the perpetra-
tor”1951 without the obvious characterization of Athanase Seromba’s conduct as 
co-perpetratorship or indirect perpetratorship.
46  Blaškiþ Appeal Judgement, para. 46.
47  Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, Separate opinion of Judge Schomburg, para. 16.
48  Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, Separate opinion of Judge Schomburg, para. 17 and fn. 31, 
referring to C. Roxin, Täterschaft und Tatherrschaft, 7th edn. (2000), pp. 275-305. See also K. 
Ambos, in: O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (1999), Art. 25 marginal no. 8.
49  Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, Separate opinion of Judge Schomburg, para. 18 and fn. 33, 
referring to C. Roxin, Täterschaft und Tatherrschaft, 7th edn. (2000), pp. 142-274. See also K. 
Ambos, in: O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (1999), Art. 25 marginal no. 9.
50  Appeal Judgement, para. 171.
51  Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, Separate opinion of Judge Schomburg, para. 20 and fn. 36 (“As 
indirect perpetratorship focuses on the indirect perpetrator’s control over the will of the direct and 
physical perpetrator, it is sometimes understood to require a particular “defect” on the part of the 
direct and physical perpetrator which excludes his criminal responsibility.”)
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9. Whilst the Majority’s approach would make it much easier to hold criminally 
liable as a principal perpetrator those persons who do not directly commit of-
fences, this approach is inconsistent with the jurisprudence. In the Stakiþ Appeal 
Judgement, the Appeals Chamber held that the Trial Chamber erred in conduct-
ing its analysis of the responsibility of the appellant within the framework of co-
perpetratorship, and unanimously and unequivocally said of co-perpetratorship 
that, “[t]his mode of liability, as deÞ ned and applied by the Trial Chamber, does 
not have support in customary international law or in the settled jurisprudence 
of this Tribunal, which is binding on the Trial Chambers.”2052 Consequently, the 
Appeals Chamber concluded that it “is not valid law within the jurisdiction of 
this Tribunal.”2153...”
Let me now turn to 
3.  SEPARATE/DISSENTING OPINIONS BEFORE AD HOC 
TRIBUNALS ARGUING AGAINST THE JCE DOCTRINE
1) Prosecutor v. Simiþ (Trial Judgement) IT-95-9-T (17 October 2003), Separate 
and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Per-Johan Lindholm, paras 2 and 5
“2. I dissociate myself from the concept or doctrine of joint criminal enterprise 
in this case as well as generally. The so-called basic form of joint criminal en-
terprise does not, in my opinion, have any substance of its own. It is nothing 
more than a new label afÞ xed to a since long well-known concept or doctrine 
in most jurisdictions as well as in international criminal law, namely co-per-
petration. What the basic form of a joint criminal enterprise comprises is very 
clearly exempliÞ ed by Judge David Hunt in his Separate Opinion in Milutinoviþ, 
Šainoviþ and Ojdaniþ.235554 The reasoning in the Kupreškiþ Trial Judgement is 
also illustrative.235655 The acts of – and the furtherance of the crime by – the 
co-perpetrators may of course differ in various ways.235756 If something else 
than participation as co-perpetrator is intended to be covered by the concept of 
joint criminal enterprise, there seems to arise a conß ict between the concept and 
the word “committed” in Article 7(1) of the Statute. Finally, also the Stakiþ Trial 
Judgement limited itself to the clear wording of the Statute when interpreting 
“committing” in the form of coperpetration. Stakiþ requires that co-perpetrators 
“can only realise their plan insofar as they act together, but each individually 
can ruin the whole plan if he does not carry out his part. To this extent he is in 
52  Stakiþ Appeal Judgement, para. 62.
53  Stakiþ Appeal Judgement, para. 62.
54  Footnote omitted.
55  Prosecutor v. Kupreškiþ et al., IT-95-16-T, Judgement, 14 January 2000, paras 772, 782.
56  Footnote omitted.
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control of the act.”235857 The Stakiþ Trial Judgement can, based on the doctrine 
of “power over the act” (“Tatherrschaft”), be read as distancing itself from the 
concept of joint criminal enterprise.235958”
5. ...”The concept or “doctrine” has caused confusion and a waste of time, and 
is in my opinion of no beneÞ t to the work of the Tribunal or the development of 
international criminal law.”
2)  Prosecutor v. Simiþ (Appeal Judgement) IT-95-9-A (28 November 2006), 
Dissenting opinion of Judge Schomburg, paras 2-3, 11-21, 23
“3. The wording of the Statute ultimately limits its interpretation. It follows that 
the only crimes or modes of liability are those foreseen in the Statute. Even with-
in the scope of the Statute, any interpretation may not exceed what is recognized 
by international law.959 Therefore, it is necessary and at the same time sufÞ cient 
to plead a speciÞ c crime and a speciÞ c mode of participation as set out in the ex-
plicit provisions of the Statute. The Prosecution is consequently not required to 
plead any legal interpretation or legal theory concerning a mode of participation 
that does not appear in the Statute, such as joint criminal enterprise, in particular 
as the Appeals Chamber has held that joint criminal enterprise is to be regarded 
as a form of “committing”.1060”
“11. On a more general note, I wish to point out that it would have been possible 
to interpret Article 7(1) of the Statute1761 as a monistic model of perpetration 
(Einheitstäterschaft) in which each participant in a crime is treated as a perpetra-
tor irrespective of his or her degree of participation.1862 Such an approach would 
have allowed the Prosecution to plead Article 7(1) of the Statute in its entirety 
without having to choose a particular mode of participation. In that case, the 
57  Quoting Roxin, Claus, Täterschaft und Tatherrschaft (Perpetration and control over the act), 6th 
ed. Berlin, New York, 1994, p. 278.
58  Prosecutor v. Stakiþ, IT-97-24-T, Judgement, 31 July 2003, paras 436-438.
59  See Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/25704, para. 34.
60  As to this, see Karemera, Ngirumpatse and Nzirorera Decision on Defence Motions Chal-
lenging the Pleading of a Joint Criminal Enterprise in a Count of Complicity in Genocide in the 
Amended Indictment, 18 May 2006, para. 8 and para. 5; Odjaniþ Decision Joint Criminal Enter-
prise, para. 20.
61  See ICTY Statute, Art. 7(1): A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise 
aided and abetted […] (emphasis added). Art. 6(1) of the ICTR Statute is identical to this provi-
sion. My views therefore also apply to the ICTR Statute as stated in Gacumbitsi Appeal Judge-
ment, Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg on the Criminal Responsibility of the Appellant for 
Committing Genocide, para. 6.
62  See, for example, Strafgesetzbuch (Austria), Sec. 12: “Treatment of all participants as per-
petrators”; for further details, see W. Schöberl, Die Einheitstäterschaft als europäisches Modell 
(2006), pp. 50-65; 197-227. See also Straffeloven (Denmark), Sec. 23(1), reprinted in Danish and 
in German translation in K. Cornils and V. Greve, Das Dänische Strafgesetz, 2nd edn. (2001); for 
further details, see K. Cornils, ibid., p. 9. See also Straffelov (Norway), Sec. 58; for further details 
regarding Norway, see W. Schöberl, Die Einheitstäterschaft als europäisches Modell (2006), pp. 
67-102; 192-227.
73
Judges would have been able to assess the signiÞ cance of an accused’s contri-
bution to a crime under the Statute at the sentencing stage, thereby saving the 
Tribunal the trouble of developing an unnecessary participation doctrine. Unfor-
tunately, the Tribunal’s jurisprudence has come to distinguish on a case-by-case 
basis between the different modes of liability.
12. In the case at hand, the Trial Chamber applied the theory of joint criminal 
enterprise. However, this concept is not expressly included in the Statute and is 
only one possible interpretation of “committing” in relation to the crimes under 
the Statute.1963
13. Indeed, the laws of the former Yugoslavia and the laws of the successor 
States on the territory of the former Yugoslavia all include the concept of co-
perpetratorship:
The Statute of the Tribunal in Article 24(1) explicitly only provides for the Tri-
bunal to have recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the 
former Yugoslavia. However, this does not exclude the possibility that the Tribu-
nal should also, by the same token, and (at least) as a matter of judicial fairness 
and courtesy have recourse to the relevant substantive laws applicable on the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia.
63  See in particular Participation in Crime: Criminal Liability of Leaders of Criminal Groups and 
Networks, Expert Opinion, Commissioned by the United Nations – International Criminal Tribu-
nal for the Former Yugoslavia, OfÞ ce of the Prosecutor- Project Coordination: Prof. Dr. Ulrich Sie-
ber., Priv. Doz. Dr. Hans-Georg Koch, Jan Michael Simon, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches 
und internationales Strafrecht, Freiburg, Germany (“Expert Opinion”), 2006.
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14. Moreover, in many other legal systems, committing is interpreted differently 
from the jurisprudence of the Tribunal. Since Nuremberg and Tokyo, both na-
tional and international criminal law have come to accept, in particular, co-per-
petratorship as a form of committing2064. For example, the recent Comparative 
Analysis of Legal Systems, carried out by the Max-Planck-Institute, Freiburg, 
Germany, illustrates that, inter alia, the following States include co-perpetrator-




64  With all due respect, I maintain my position that co-perpetratorship is Þ rmly entrenched in cus-
tomary international law. Unfortunately, when the Stakiþ Trial Judgement was rendered, the Trial 
Chamber – solely composed of civil law judges – took it for granted that the notion of co-perpetra-
torship need not be academically supported by reference to State practice. With the availability of 
the Expert Opinion, supra note 19 [i.e. supra note 63 of this article], such an empirical basis can 
now be delivered.
65  See Expert Opinion, supra note 19 [i.e. supra note 63 of this article]. Moreover, this research 
illustrates that even States which do not codify co-perpetratorship in their criminal codes recognize 
this concept, as demonstrated by settled jurisprudence. This includes Sweden (Expert Opinion, Re-
port on Sweden, p. 10) and France (Expert Opinion, Report on France, p. 6). Although not included 
in the legal analysis of the Expert Opinion, Switzerland’s courts have also developed a similar ap-
proach: see M. A. Niggli and H. Wiprächtiger (eds.), Basler Kommentar – Strafgesetzbuch I, Vor 
Art. 24 marginal number 7 et seq.
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In addition, the following States have accepted the concept of co-perpetrator-
ship:
“17. As an international criminal court, it is incumbent upon this Tribunal not 
to turn a blind eye to these developments in modern criminal law and to show 
open-mindedness, respect and tolerance – unalienable prerequisites to all kinds 
of supranational or international cooperation in criminal matters – by accepting 
internationally recognized legal interpretations and theories such as the notion of 
co-perpetratorship. Co-perpetratorship differs slightly from joint criminal enter-
prise with respect to the key element of attribution.2666 However, both approach-
es widely overlap and have therefore to be harmonized in the jurisprudence of 
both ad hoc Tribunals. Such harmonization could at the same time provide all 
categories of joint criminal enterprise with sharper contours by combining ob-
jective and subjective components in an adequate way. As pointed out by the 
Appeals Chamber in the Kunarac Appeal Judgement, “the laws of war ‘are not 
static, but by continual adaptation follow the needs of a changing world.’”2767 
In general, harmonization will lead to greater acceptance of the Tribunal’s juris-
prudence by international criminal courts in the future and in national systems, 
which understand imputed criminal responsibility for “committing” to include 
co-perpetratorship[…]”
“20. Modern criminal law has come to apply the notion of indirect perpetration 
even where the direct and physical perpetrator is criminally responsible (“perpe-
trator behind the perpetrator”).3168 This is especially relevant if crimes are com-
mitted through an organized structure of power. Since the identity of the direct 
and physical perpetrator(s) is irrelevant, the control and, consequently, the main 
responsibility for the crimes committed shifts to the persons occupying a leading 
position in such an organized structure of power.3269 These persons must there-
66  While joint criminal enterprise is based primarily on the common state of mind of the perpetra-
tors (subjective criterion), co-perpetratorship also depends on whether the perpetrator exercises 
control over the criminal act (objective criterion).
67  Kunarac Appeal Judgement, para. 67, quoting the International Military Tribunal at Nurem-
berg.
68  For a detailed analysis and references, see Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, Separate Opinion 
of Judge Schomburg on the Criminal Responsibility of the Appellant for Committing Genocide; 
see also C. Roxin, Täterschaft und Tatherrschaft, 8th edn. (2006), pp. 141-274; see also Héctor 
Olásolo and Ana Pérez Cepeda, 4 ICLR (2004), pp. 475-526.
69  In one of its leading cases, the Politbüro Case, the German Federal Supreme Court (Bun-
 
76
fore be regarded as perpetrators irrespective of whether the direct and physical 
perpetrators are criminally responsible themselves or (under exceptional circum-
stances) not.”
3) Prosecutor v. Martiþ (Appeal Judgement) IT-95-11-A (08 October 2008), 
Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg on the Individual Criminal Responsibil-
ity of Milan Martiþ, paras 2, 5-9
“2. However, I feel compelled to write separately because I Þ rmly believe that 
Martiþ’s criminal conduct has to be qualiÞ ed as that of a (co)-perpetrator un-
der the mode of liability of “committing” pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Statute 
of the International Tribunal. My concern is that Martiþ’s criminal conduct is 
primarily qualiÞ ed as relying on membership in a group – the so-called joint 
criminal enterprise (JCE) – which cannot be reconciled with the Statute and on 
the contrary seems to trivialize Martiþ’s guilt. Martiþ has to be seen as a high-
ranking principal perpetrator and not just as a member of a criminal group.”
“5. The Statute does not penalize individual criminal responsibility through JCE. 
The Statute does not criminalize the membership in any association or organiza-
tion. The purpose of this International Tribunal is to punish individuals and not 
to decide on the responsibility of states, organizations or associations. As stated 
in Nuremberg: 
Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract 
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can 
the provisions of international law be enforced.670
desgerichtshof) held three high-ranking politicians of the former German Democratic Republic 
responsible as indirect perpetrators for killings of persons at the East German border by bor-
der guards (German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof), Judgement of 26 July 1994, 
BGHSt.. 40, pp. 218-240); Argentinean Courts have entered convictions for crimes committed 
by members of the Junta regime based on indirect perpetratorship (See Argentinean National Ap-
peals Court, Judgement on Human Rights Violations by Former Military Leaders of 9 December 
1985. For a report and translation of the crucial parts of the judgement, see 26 ILM (1987), pp. 
317-372. The Argentine National Appeals Court found the notion of indirect perpetratorship to be 
included in Art. 514 of the Argentine Code of Military Justice and in Art. 45 of the Argentine Penal 
Code. The Argentine Supreme Court upheld this judgement on 30 December 1986). The Expert 
Opinion gives further examples: In Portugal a law was enacted to address the crimes during the 
Estado Novo which made it possible to convict those organising the crimes “behind the scenes” 
by relying only on their function and power within the organisational system: Lei n.° 8/75 de 25 
Julho de 1975, published in Boletim do Ministério da Justiça N° 249 de Outubro de 1975, p. 684 
et seq. (cited in Report on Portugal, p. 15). The Spanish Tribunal Supremo employed the notion of 
“perpetrator behind the perpetrator” in a case dating from 1994: Sentencia Tribunal Supremo núm. 
1360/1994 (cited in Report on Spain, p. 15). On a more general note see C. Roxin, Täterschaft und 
Tatherrschaft, 8th ed. (2006), pp. 242 - 252.
70  International Military Tribunal, Judgement and Sentence of 1 October 1946, Criminals before 
the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946, Vol. I, p. 
223.
77
Consequently, any idea of collective responsibility, shifting the blame from in-
dividuals to associations or organizations and deducing criminal responsibility 
from membership in such associations or organizations, must be rejected as not 
only ultra vires but also counterproductive to the International Tribunal’s man-
date of bringing peace and reconciliation to the territory of the former Yugoslavia. 
It is therefore that I cannot agree with this Judgement when it describes a perpe-
trator as “a member of a JCE”771, when it speaks of “members of a JCE [who] 
could be held liable for crimes committed by principal perpetrators who were not 
members of the JCE”872 and when it refers to the accused’s “fellow members [of 
the JCE].”973 While the Appeals Chamber has in the past explicitly stated that 
“criminal liability pursuant to a joint criminal enterprise is not a liability for mere 
membership or for conspiring to commit crimes,”1074 the constant expansion of 
the concept of JCE in the jurisprudence of the International Tribunal suggests the 
contrary. In this context, I recall the report of the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, in which he stated that: 
The question arises … whether a juridical person, such as an associa-
tion or organization, may be considered criminal as such and thus its 
members, for that reason alone, be made subject to the jurisdiction of the 
International Tribunal. The Secretary-General believes that this concept 
should not be retained in regard to the International Tribunal. The crimi-
nal acts set out in this statute are carried out by natural persons; such 
person would be subject to the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal 
irrespective of membership in groups.1175
6. I need not reiterate the fact that the Appeals Chamber of this International 
Tribunal has unnecessarily and without any reasoning proprio motu discarded 
internationally accepted deÞ nitions of the term committing, such as the concepts 
of co-perpetration, perpetrator behind the perpetrator or indirect perpetrator, all 
of them forming part of customary international law1376 as was held in particular 
in the most important recent decisions of the International Criminal Court.1477 
SufÞ ce it to say that it is not helpful at all, at this stage of the development of 
71  Footnote omitted.
72  Footnote omitted.
73  Footnote omitted.
74  Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinoviþ Challenging Jurisdiction – Joint Criminal Enterprise, 21 May 
2003, para. 26.
75  The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Secu-
rity Council Re808 (1993), U.N. Doc S/25704 (3 May 1993), para. 51.
76  See for a detailed argument: Prosecutor v. Blagoje Simiþ, Case No. IT-95-9-A, Appeal Judge-
ment, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schomburg, 28 November 2006 and Sylvestre Gagumbitsi 
v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A, Appeal Judgement, Separate Opinion of Judge 
Schomburg on the Criminal Responsibility of the Appellant for Committing Genocide, 7 July 
2006
77  Footnote omitted.
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international criminal law, that there now exist two competing concepts of com-
mission as a mode of liability. The unambiguous language of both decisions ren-
dered by Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Court endorses the 
concept of co-perpetration when interpreting the word “to commit” under Article 
25(3)(a) of the ICC Statute.1578 For this mode of liability, there can be only one 
deÞ nition in international criminal law.1679
7. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber’s constant adjustment of what is encom-
passed by the notion of JCE1780 raises serious concerns with regard to the prin-
ciple of nullum crimen sine lege. The lack of an objective element in the so-
called third (“extended”) category of JCE is particularly worrying. It cannot be 
sufÞ cient to state that the accused person is liable for any actions by another 
individual, where “the commission of the crimes … were a natural and foresee-
able consequence of a common criminal purpose.”1881 What is missing here is 
an additional objective component, such as control over the crime,1982 as would 
be provided under the concepts of co-perpetration or indirect perpetration. This 
necessary element of having control over the crime would on the one hand serve 
as a safeguard to adequately limit the scope of individual criminal responsibility, 
and on the other hand properly distinguish between a principal and an accessory. 
By contrast, the current shifting deÞ nition of the third category of JCE has all 
the potential of leading to a system, which would impute guilt solely by associa-
tion.
8. To avoid any misunderstanding: In the present case, based on the sum of all 
Þ ndings of the Trial Chamber, Martiþ exercised the necessary control over the 
criminal conduct and was consequently a principal perpetrator of all the crimes 
for which he was convicted. It is immaterial that he was physically removed 
from many of the crimes. As was posited by the Jerusalem District Court in the 
Eichmann case: 
In such an enormous and complicated crime as the one we are now con-
sidering, wherein many people participated at various levels and in vari-
78  The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, 
Decision on the ConÞ rmation of Charges, 30 September 2008, para. 510. The Prosecutor v. Tho-
mas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the ConÞ rmation of Charges, 29 
January 2007, para. 338.
79  Footnote omitted.
80  See for instance the varying language employed in the Tadiþ Appeal Judgement (paras 204 et 
seq., para. 228), the Brāanin Appeal Judgement (paras 410 et seq., paras 418 et seq.), the Limaj 
Appeal Judgement (para. 119), explicitly limiting the responsibility for crimes committed by 
members [sic] of the JCE, whereas in this Judgement, at para. 171, such limitation is explicitly 
rejected.
81  Judgement, para. 171
82  See The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07, Decision on the ConÞ rmation of Charges, 30 September 2008, para. 485 with further ex-
haustive references.
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ous modes of activity – the planners, the organizers and those executing 
the acts, according to their various ranks – there is not much point in 
using the ordinary concepts of counselling and soliciting to commit a 
crime. For these crimes were committed en masse, not only in regard 
to the number of the victims, but also in regard to the numbers of those 
who perpetrated the crime, and the extent to which any one of the many 
criminals were close to, or remote from, the actual killer of the victim, 
means nothing as far as the measure of his responsibility is concerned. 
On the contrary, in general, the degree of responsibility increases as we 
draw further away from the man who uses the fatal instrument with his 
own hands and reach the higher ranks of command…2083
9. I also note with concern that neither the artiÞ cial concept of JCE nor its com-
partmentalization in three categories has any added value when it comes to sen-
tencing. The decisive element must be in principle the individual contribution of 
an accused. At times, the incorrect impression is given that the third category of 
JCE attracts a lower sentence simply because of its catch-all nature. However, 
in principle, a person’s guilt must be described as increasing in tandem with his 
position in the hierarchy: The higher in rank or further detached the mastermind 
is from the person who commits a crime with his own hands, the greater is his 
responsibility.2184
 
4) Gacumbitsi v. The Prosecutor (Appeal Judgement) ICTR-2001-64-A (7 July 
2006), Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg on the Criminal Responsibility 
of the Appellant for Committing Genocide, paras 19-22, 24-27
“19. Especially the notion of indirect perpetration has been employed in cases 
concerning organized crime, terrorism, white collar crime or state induced crimi-
nality. For example, Argentinean Courts have entered convictions for crimes com-
mitted by members of the Junta regime based on indirect perpetratorship.3485 In 
one of its leading cases, the Politbüro Case, the German Federal Supreme Court 
83  Attorney General of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, District Court of Jerusalem, Judgement of 12 
December 1961, 36 ILR 18 (168), para. 197.
84  Footnote omitted.
85  See Argentinean National Appeals Court, Judgement on Human Rights Violations by Former 
Military Leaders of 9 December 1985. For a report and translation of the crucial parts of the judge-
ment, see 26 ILM (1987), pp. 317-372. The Argentinean National Appeals Court found the notion 
of indirect perpetratorship to be included in Art. 514 of the Argentinean Code of Military Justice 
and in Art. 45 of the Argentinean Penal Code. The Argentinean Supreme Court upheld this judge-
ment on 30 December 1986. See also K. Ambos and C. Grammer, Tatherrschaft qua Organisation. 
Die Verantwortlichkeit der argentinischen Militärführung für den Tod von Elisabeth Käsemann, 
in: T. Vormbaum (ed.), 4 Jahrbuch für juristische Zeitgeschichte (2002/2003), pp. 529-553 (ofÞ cial 
Legal Opinion on the Responsibility of the Argentinean Military Leaders for the Death of Elisa-
beth Käsemann, commissioned by the (German) Coalition against Impunity). On the (German) 
Coalition against Impunity, see <http://www.fdcl-berlin.de>.
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(Bundesgerichtshof) held three high-ranking politicians of the former German 
Democratic Republic responsible as indirect perpetrators for killings of persons 
at the East German border by border guards.3586
20. Modern criminal law has come to apply the notion of indirect perpetration 
even where the direct and physical perpetrator is criminally responsible (“perpe-
trator behind the perpetrator”).3687 This is especially relevant if crimes are com-
mitted through an organized structure of power in which the direct and physical 
perpetrator is nothing but a cog in the wheel that can be replaced immediately. 
Since the identity of the direct and physical perpetrator is irrelevant, the con-
trol and, consequently, the main responsibility for the crimes committed shifts 
to the persons occupying a leading position in such an organized structure of 
power.3788 These persons must therefore be regarded as perpetrators irrespective 
of whether the direct and physical perpetrators are criminally responsible them-
selves or (under exceptional circumstances) not. This approach was applied, for 
example, by German courts in cases concerning killings at the East German bor-
der: as far as border guards who had killed persons were identiÞ ed and brought 
to trial, they were generally convicted as perpetrators. This, however, did not 
reduce the criminal responsibility of those who had acted “behind the scenes”. 
As the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) held in the afore-
mentioned Politbüro Case:
 [I]n certain groups of cases, however, even though the direct perpetrator 
has unlimited responsibility for his actions, the contribution by the man 
behind the scenes almost automatically brings about the constituent ele-
ments of the offence intended by that man behind the scenes. Such is the 
case, for example, when the man behind the scenes takes advantage of 
certain basic conditions through certain organisational structures, where 
his contribution to the event sets in motion regular procedures. Such 
basic conditions with regular procedures are found particularly often 
among organisational structures of the State […] as well as in hierar-
chies of command. If the man behind the scenes acts in full awareness 
of these circumstances, particularly if he exploits the direct perpetrator’s 
unconditional willingness to bring about the constituent elements of the 
crime, and if he wills the result as that of his own actions, then he is a 
perpetrator by indirect perpetration. He has control over the action […]. 
In such cases, failing to treat the man behind the scenes as a perpetrator 
would not do justice to the signiÞ cance of his contribution to the crime, 
86  German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof), Judgement of 26 July 1994, BGHSt 40, 
pp. 218-240.
87  As indirect perpetratorship focuses on the indirect perpetrator’s control over the will of the di-
rect and physical perpetrator, it is sometimes understood to require a particular “defect” on the part 
of the direct and physical perpetrator which excludes his criminal responsibility.
88  See C. Roxin, Täterschaft und Tatherrschaft, 7th edn. (2000), pp. 242 - 252.
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especially since responsibility often increases rather than decreases the 
further one is from the scene of the crime […].3889
21. For these reasons, the notion of indirect perpetratorship suits the needs also 
of international criminal law particularly well.3990 It is a means to bridge any 
potential physical distance from the crime scene of persons who must be re-
garded as main perpetrators because of their overall involvement and control 
over the crimes committed. This was recognized upon the establishment of the 
International Criminal Court whose Statute, in Article 25(3)(a), includes both 
the notion of co-perpetration and indirect perpetration (“perpetrator behind the 
perpetrator)”... Given the wide acknowledgement of co-perpetratorship and in-
direct perpetratorship, the ICC Statute does not create new law in this respect, 
but reß ects existing law.
4. DECISIONS RENDERED BY THE ICC TO DISCONTINUE THE USE 
OF THE CONCEPT OF JCE
Already in The Prosecutor v. Lubanga (Pre-Trial Chamber Decision on the Con-
Þ rmation of Charges) ICC-01/04-01/06 (29 January 2007) ,91 ICC clearly departs 
in particular at paras 235 et seq. from the overly subjective concept of JCE.
The same Pre-Trial Chamber went on with its in-depth analysis of this mode of 
liability in The Prosecutor v. Katanga et al. (Pre-Trial Chamber Decision on the 
ConÞ rmation of Charges) ICC-01/04-01/07 (30 September 2008):
“495. The commission of a crime through another person is a model of criminal 
responsibility recognised by the world’s major legal systems.65592 The principal 
(the ‘perpetrator-by-means’) uses the executor (the direct perpetrator) as a tool 
89  German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof), Judgement of 26 July 1994, BGHSt 40, 
pp. 218-240, p. 236.
90  This appears to be acknowledged also by Pre-Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal 
Court, who stated in a recent decision: In the Chamber’s view, there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that, given the alleged hierarchical relationship between Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and 
the other members of the UPC and the FPLC, the concept of indirect perpetration which, along 
with that of co-perpetration based on joint control of the crime referred to in the Prosecution’s 
Application, is provided for in article 25(3) of the Statute, could be applicable to Mr Thomas Lu-
banga Dyilo’s alleged role in the commission of the crimes set out in the Prosecution’s Application. 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision Concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I’s Decision of 10 
February 2006 and the Incorporation of Documents into the Record of the Case against Mr. Tho-
mas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, 24 February 2006, Annex I: Decision on the Prosecutor’s 
Application for a Warrant of Arrest, Article 58, para. 96 (emphasis added).
91  The Prosecutor v. Lubanga (Pre-Trial Chamber Decision on the ConÞ rmation of Charges) ICC-
01/04-01/06 (29 January 2007), paras 322-367.
92  See FLETCHER, O.P., Rethinking Criminal Law, New York, Oxford University Press, 2000, 
p. 639; WERLE, G., “Individual criminal responsibility under Article 25 of the Rome Statute”, 5 
J. Int’l Criminal Justice 963 (2007).
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or an instrument for the commission of the crime. Typically, the executor who is 
being used as a mere instrument will not be fully criminally responsible for his 
actions.65693 As such, his innocence will depend upon the availability of accept-
able justiÞ cations and/or excuses for his actions. Acceptable justiÞ cations and 
excuses include the person’s: i) having acted under a mistaken belief; ii) acted 
under duress; and/or iii) not having the capacity for blameworthiness.
496. A concept has developed in legal doctrine that acknowledges the possibility 
that a person who acts through another may be individually criminally responsi-
ble, regardless of whether the executor (the direct perpetrator) is also responsi-
ble. This doctrine is based on the early works of Claus Roxin and is identiÞ ed by 
the term: ‘perpetrator behind the perpetrator’ (Täter hinter dem Täter).65794
497. The underlying rationale of this model of criminal responsibility is that the 
perpetrator behind the perpetrator is responsible because he controls the will of 
the direct perpetrator. As such, in some scenarios it is possible for both perpetra-
tors to be criminally liable as principals: the direct perpetrator for his fulÞ lment 
of the subjective and objective elements of the crime, and the perpetrator behind 
the perpetrator for his control over the crime via his control over the will of the 
direct perpetrator.
498. Several groups of cases have been presented as examples for the perpetrator 
behind the perpetrator’s being assigned principal responsibility despite the exist-
ence of a responsible, direct perpetrator (i.e., one whose actions are not exculpat-
ed by mistake, duress, or the lack of capacity for blame-worthiness).65895 This 
notwithstanding, the cases most relevant to international criminal law are those in 
which the perpetrator behind the perpetrator commits the crime through another 
by means of “control over an organisation” (Organisationsherrschaft).65996”
a. Control over the organisation
500. For the purposes of this Decision, the control over the crime approach is 
predicated on a notion of a principal’s “control over the organisation”. The Cham-
ber relies on this notion of “control over the organisation” for numerous reasons, 
93  AMBOS, K., “Article 25: Individual Criminal Responsibility”, in TRIFFTERER, O. (Ed.), 
Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 
1999, p. 479; JIMENEZ DE ASÜA, L., Lecciones de Derecho Penal, México, Colección Clâsicos 
del Derecho, 1995, p. 337.
94  ROXIN, C., „Straftaten im Rahmen organisatorischer Machtapparate“, Goltdammer‘s Archiv 
für Strafrecht(\963\pp. 193-207.
95  Such scenarios include, inter alia, cases in which the perpetrator behind the perpetrator com-
mits a crime through the direct perpetrator by misleading the latter about the seriousness of the 
crime; the qualifying circumstances of the crime; and/or the identity of the victim. See STRATEN-
WERTH, G. & KUHLEN L., Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil I, 5th ed., Köln, Heymanns, 2004, § 
12/59-67; ROXIN, C., Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil II, München, C.H. Beck, 2003, § 25/94-104.
96  ROXIN, C., „Straftaten im Rahmen organisatorischer Machtapparate“, Goltdammer‘s Archiv 
für Strafrecht (1963), pp. 193-207; AMBOS, K., La parte general del derecho penal internacional, 
Montevideo, Ternis, 2005, p. 240.
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including the following: (i) it has been incorporated into the framework of the Stat-
ute; (ii) it has been increasingly used in national jurisdictions; and (iii) it has been 
addressed in the jurisprudence of the international tribunals. Such notion has also 
been endorsed in the jurisprudence of Pre-Trial Chamber III of this Court.
506. This doctrine has also been applied in international criminal law in the juris-
prudence of the international tribunals.67297 In The Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakiþ 
Judgement, Trial Chamber II of the ICTY relied on the liability theory of coper-
petration of a crime through another person as a way to avoid the inconsistencies 
of applying the so-called “Joint Criminal Enterprise” theory of criminal liability 
to senior leaders and commanders.67398
507. As noted by the Defence for Germain Katanga,67499 the Trial Chamber’s 
Judgement was overturned on appeal. However, the reasoning of the ICTY Ap-
peals Chamber’s Judgement is of utmost importance to an understanding of why 
the impugned decision does not obviate its validity as a mode of liability under 
the Rome Statute.
508. The Appeals Chamber rejected this mode of liability by stating that it did not 
form part of customary international law.675100 However, under article 21(l)(a) of 
the Statute, the Þ rst source of applicable law is the Statute. Principles and rules of 
international law constitute a secondary source applicable only when the statutory 
material fails to prescribe a legal solution. Therefore, and since the Rome Statute 
expressly provides for this speciÞ c mode of liability, the question as to whether 
customary law admits or discards the ‘joint commission through another person’ is 
not relevant for this Court. This is a good example of the need not to transfer the ad 
hoc tribunals’ case law mechanically to the system of the Court.676101
509. Finally, most recently, the Pre-Trial Chamber III of the Court also endorsed 
this notion of individual criminal responsibility in the case of The Prosecutor 
v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo. Having established the suspect’s position as the 
leader of the organisation and described the functioning of the militia, the Pre-
Trial Chamber III stated:
97  ICTR, Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A, Appeals Judgement, “separate 
opinion of Judge Schomburg”, 7 July 2006, paras 14-22; ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Milomor Stakiþ, 
Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgement, 31 July 2003, paras 439 et seq.; paras 741 et seq. According to 
AMBOS, K., Internationales Strafrecht, München Beck 2006, §7/29, its principles are to be recog-
nized in the Nuremberg’s jurisprudence. United States of America v. Alstotter et al. (“The Justice 
Case”), 3 T.W.C. 1 (1948), 6 L.R.T.W.C. 1 (1948), 14 Ann. Dig. 278 (1948).
98  ICTY) The Prosecutor v Milomir Stakiþ, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Judgement, 31 July 2003, 
para. 439, 741 [rest omitted].
99  ICC-01/04-01/07-698, para. 26.
100  Footnote omitted.
101  WERLE, G., “Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute”, 5 J. Int’l Criminal 
Justice 953 (2007), pp. 961-962: “the ICC Statute must be seen on its own as an independent set of 
rules. Hence, a mechanical transfer of the ad hoc tribunals’ case law is deÞ nitely not the correct ap-
proach; WERLE, G., Volkerstrafrecht, 2nd ed., Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2007, paras 425 et seq.
84
 In light of the foregoing, the Chamber considers that there are reason-
able grounds to believe that, as a result of his authority over his military 
organisation, Mr. [...] had the means to exercise control over the crimes 
committed by MLC troops deployed in the CAR.677102
510. In sum, the acceptance of the notion of ‘control over an organised apparatus 
of power’ in modern legal doctrine,678103 its recognition in national jurisdic-
tions,679104 its discussion in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals which, as 
demonstrated, should be distinguished from its application before this Court, 
its endorsement in the jurisprudence of the Pre-Trial Chamber III of the Inter-
national Criminal Court but, most importantly, its incorporation into the legal 
102  ICC-01/05-01/08-14-tENG, para. 78.
103  SANCINETTI, M., Teoria del delito y disvalor de action • una investigación sobre las conse-
cuencias prâcticas de un concepto personal de ilicito circunscripto al disvalor de action, Buenos 
Aires, Hammurabi, 1991, pp. 712 et seq.; SANCINETTI, M., Derechos humanos en la Argentina 
post dictatorial, Buenos Aires, Lea, 1988, pp. 27 et seq.; SANCINETTI, M. & FERRANTE, M., 
El derecho pénal en la protection de los derechos humanos, Buenos Aires,Hammurabi, 1999, p. 
313; BACIGALUPO, E., Principios de Derecho Pénal, Parte General, Buenos Aires, Hammurabi, 
1987, p. 334; AMBOS, K., La parte general del derecho penal international, Montevideo, Ternis, 
2005, pp. 216-240; AMBOS, K., Internationales Strafrecht, München, Beck, 2006, §§ 7/29 et seq.; 
STRATEN WERTH, G. & KUHLEN, L., Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil I, 5* ed., Köln, Heymanns, 
2004, § 12/65 et seq.; KÜHL, K., Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil, 4th ed., München, Vahlen, 2002, 
§ 20/73 et seq.; WESSELS, J. & BEULKE, W., Strafrecht, Allgemeiner Teil, 36th ed., Heidel-
berg, Müller, 2006, n. 541; ROXIN, C., „Straftaten im Rahmen organisatorischer Machtapparate“, 
Goltdammer‘s Archiv für Strafrecht (1963), pp. 193-207; ROXIN, C., Taterschaft und Tatherr-
schaft, 8th ed., Berlin, De Gruyter, 2006, pp. 248 et seq.; ROXIN, C., „Organistionsherrschaft 
und Tatentschlossenheit“, 7 Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik (2006), p. 294; 
ROXIN, C., „Anmerkungen zum Vortrag von Prof. Herzberg“, in AMELUNG, K. (Ed.), Individu-
elle Verantwortung und Beteiligungsverhaltnisse bei Straftaten in bürokratischen Organisationen 
des Staates, der Wirtschaft und der Gesellschaft, Sinzheim, Pro Universitate, 2000, pp. 55 et seq.; 
HERZBERG, R.D., Täterschaft und Teilnahme, München, Beck, 1977, pp. 42 et seq.; HIRSCH, 
H., Rechtsstaatliches Strafrecht und staatlich gesteuertes Unrecht, Opladen, Westdeutscher Ver-
lag. 1996, pp. 22-23; BLOY, R., „Grenzen der Täterschaft bei fremdhändiger Tatausfuhrung“, 
Goltdammer‘s Archiv fur Strafrecht (1996), pp. 425-442; SCHÖNKE, A. & SCHRÖDER, H., 
Kommentar zum Strafgesetzbuch, 26* ed., München, Beck, 2001, § 25/25a; TRÖNDLE, H. & 
FISCHER, T., Strafgesetzbuch, Kommentar, 53rd ed., München, Beck, 2006, § 25/7; KÜPPER, 
G., „Zur Abgrenzung der Täterschaftsformen“, Goltdammer‘s Archiv für Strafrecht (1998), p. 
524; SCHLÖSSER, J., Soziale Tatherrschaft, Berlin, Duncker und Humblot, 2004, p. 145 et seq.; 
RADTKE, H., „Mittelbare Täterschaft kraft Organisationsherrschaft im nationalen und internatio-
nalen Strafrecht“, Goltdammer ‚s Archiv für Strafrecht (2006), pp. 350 et seq.
104  Federal Supreme Court of Germany, BGHSt 40, 218, at pp. 236 et seq.; 45, 270 at p. 296; 
BGHSt 47, 100; BGHSt 37, 106; BGH NJW 1998, 767 at p. 769. The Federal Appeals Chamber of 
Argentina, The Juntas Trial, Case No. 13/84, chap. 7/5. Judgement of the Supreme Court of Justice 
of Peru, Case No. 5385-200. 14 December 2007. Supreme Court of Chile (investigating magis-
trate), Fallos de Mes, ano XXXV, noviembre de 1993, 12 November 1993; Supreme Tribunal of 
Spain,, penal chamber, Case No. 12966/1994,2 July 1994 (Judge Bacigalupo). National Court of 
Spain, Central investigating tribunal No. 5, 29 March 2006
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framework of the Court, present a compelling case for the Chamber’s allowing 
this approach to criminal liability for the purposes of this Decision.”
521. Co-perpetration based on joint control over the crime involves the division 
of essential tasks between two or more persons, acting in a concerted manner, 
for the purposes of committing that crime. As explained, the fulÞ lment of the 
essential task(s) can be carried out by the co-perpetrators physically or they may 
be executed through another person.”
a. Existence of an agreement or common plan between two or more persons
522. In the view of the Chamber, the Þ rst objective requirement of co-perpetra-
tion based on joint control over the crime is the existence of an agreement or 
common plan between the persons who physically carry out the elements of the 
crime or between those who carry out the elements of the crime through another 
individual. Participation in the crimes committed by the latter without coordina-
tion with one’s co-perpetrators falls outside the scope of co-perpetration within 
the meaning of article 25(3)(a) of the Statute.
523. As explained in the Lubanga Decision, the common plan must include the 
commission of a crime.687105 Furthermore, the Chamber considered that the 
agreement need not be explicit, and that its existence can be inferred from the 
subsequent concerted action of the co-perpetrators.688106
b. Coordinated essential contribution by each co-perpetrator resulting in the re-
alisation of the objective elements of the crime
524. The Chamber considers that the second objective requirement of co-perpe-
tration based on joint control over the crime is the coordinated essential contri-
bution made by each co-perpetrator resulting in the realisation of the objective 
elements of the crime.
525. When the objective elements of an offence are carried out by a plurality 
of persons acting within the framework of a common plan, only those to whom 
essential tasks have been assigned - and who, consequently, have the power to 
frustrate the commission of the crime by not performing their tasks - can be said 
to have joint control over the crime. Where such persons commit the crimes 
through others, their essential contribution may consist of activating the mecha-
nisms which lead to the automatic compliance with their orders and, thus, the 
commission of the crimes.
526. Although some authors have linked the essential character of a task – and 
hence, the ability to exercise joint control over the crime - to its performance at 
the execution stage,689107 the Statute does not encompasses any such restric-
105  ICC-01/04-01/06-803-OEN, para. 344.
106  ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN, para. 345.
107  ROX1N, C., Täterschaft und Tatherrschaft, 8th ed., Berlin, De Gruyter, 2006, pp. 292 et seq. 
According to ROXIN, those who contribute only to the commission of a crime at the preparatory 
stage cannot be described as co-perpetrators even if they carry out tasks with a view to imple-
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tion. Designing the attack, supplying weapons and ammunitions, exercising the 
power to move the previously recruited and trained troops to the Þ elds; and/or 
coordinating and monitoring the activities of those troops, may constitute contri-
butions that must be considered essential regardless of when are they exercised 
(before or during the execution stage of the crime).
This jurisprudence was accepted and further Þ ne-tuned in The Prosecutor v. 
Bemba (Pre-Trial Chamber Decision on the ConÞ rmation of Charges) ICC-
01/05-01/08 (15 June 2009), there in particular at paras 350-353, 369-371. 
Space available does not allow to go into further details even though a careful 
reading of all these three decisions (Lubanga, Katanga, Bemba) is more than 
warranted.
However, it has to be observed that in the Þ rst decision ever delivered by a trial 
chamber of the ICC (Lubanga-Verdict108 of March 2012) it was only the majority 
that, convincingly, upheld this approach. The British Judge Fulford, for whatever 
reasons, felt obliged, to express his preferences for another “interpretation” of 
“committing”, thus departing from the underlying statutory norms. May be the 
underlying intent is to pave the way for a new kind of JCE, knowing that with a 
view to the settled jurisprudence and careful analysis of the ECCC (see below V 
2) on this basis at least the third extended category can no longer be accepted as 
being beyond reasonable doubt part of customary international law.
menting the common plan. This point of view is shared by MIR PUIG, S., Derecho Penal, Parte 
General, Editorial Reppertor, 6* ed., Barcelona, Editorial Reppertor, 2000, p. 385; HERZEBERG, 
R.D.,Täterschaft und Teilnahme. , München, Beck, 1977, pp. 65 et seq.: KÖHLER, M., Strafrecht 
Allgemeiner Teil, Berlin, Springer, 1997, p. 518. However, many other authors do not share this 
point of view. See inter alia: MUNOZ CONDE, F., “Dominio de la voluntad en virtud de aparatos 
organizados en organizaciones no desvinculadas del Derecho”, 6 Revista Penal (2000), p. 113;PE-
REZ CEPEDA, A., “Criminalidad en la empresa: problemas de autoria y participación”, 9 Revista 
Penal (2002), p. 106 et seq; JESCHECK, H. & WE1GEND, T., Lehrbuch des Strafrechts, Allge-
meiner Teil, 5th ed., Berlin, Duncker und Humblot, 1996, p. 680; KÜHL K., Strafrecht Allgemei-
ner Teil, 2nd ed., München, Vahlen, 1997, p. 111 ; KINDHÄUSER, U., Strafgesetzbuch, Lehr- und 
Praxiskommentar, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2002, para. 25, No. 38.
108  ICC-01/04-01/06 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. The verdict was rendered by Trial 
Chamber I, composed of Judge Adrian Fulford (United Kingdom), as Presiding Judge, Judge Eliz-
abeth Odio Benito (Costa Rica) and Judge René Blattmann (Bolivia). Although the Þ rst two judges 
have written separate and dissenting opinions on some issues, the verdict was unanimous.
87
5. THE UNEXPECTED REVIVAL OF THE JCE CONCEPT BY HY-
BRID/INTERNATIONALIZED TRIBUNALS
1) Special Court/Sierra Leone
Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao (Appeal Judgement), SCSL-04-15-A 
(26 October 2009), paras 400-402, 475, 485  
“400. Based on the legal authorities and reasoning provided for these holdings, 
and considering that they have been consistently afÞ rmed by the subsequent ju-
risprudence of both the ICTY and the ICTR,975109 the Appeals Chamber is satis-
Þ ed that the holdings reß ect customary international law at the time the crimes in 
the present case were committed, and on that basis endorses them. Kallon’s sub-
mission that JCE liability cannot attach for crimes committed by principal perpe-
trators who are not proven to be members of the JCE is therefore dismissed.
 401. Kallon fails to develop whether, and if so how, the above holdings in 
Brāanin are contrary to his position that the accused must be shown to have 
participated “causally” in at least one element of the actus reus by the principal 
perpetrator.976110 Although the accused’s participation in the JCE need not be a 
sine qua non, without which the crimes could or would not have been commit-
ted,977111 it must at least be a signiÞ cant contribution to the crimes for which the 
accused is to be found responsible.978112 As Brāanin makes clear, this standard 
applies also where the accused participates in the JCE by way of using non-JCE 
members to commit crimes in furtherance of the common purpose.979113
 402. Lastly, Kallon’s submission that the Brāanin holdings are inapplicable in 
the present case is based on the premise that the Common Criminal Purpose 
found by the Trial Chamber was not inherently criminal. As that premise is er-
roneous, this submission fails.980114
475. At issue here are primarily the mens rea elements for JCE 1 and JCE 3. 
Under JCE 1, also known as the “basic” form of JCE, liability attaches where the 
accused intended the commission of the crime in question and intended to par-
ticipate in a common plan aimed at its commission.1235115 In other words, JCE 1 
liability attaches to crimes within the common criminal purpose.1236116 By con-
trast, JCE 3 liability attaches to crimes which are not part of the common crimi-
109  Martiþ Appeal Judgment, paras 168-169; Limaj et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 120; Krajišnik 
Appeal Judgment, paras 225-226; Milutinoviþ et al. Trial Judgment, Vol. I, paras 98, 99; Zigi-
ranyirazo Trial Judgment, para. 384.
110  Kallon Appeal, para. 48.
111  KvoĀka et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 98; Tadiþ Appeal Judgment paras 191, 199.
112  Krajišnik Appeal Judgment, para. 675; Brāanin Appeal Judgment, para. 430.
113  Brāanin Appeal Judgment, para. 430.
114  See supra, para. 305.
115  Brāanin Appeal Judgment, para. 365.
116  Brāanin Appeal Judgment, para. 418; Martiþ Appeal Judgment, para. 82.
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nal purpose.1237117 That is why it is often referred to as the “extended” form of 
JCE.1238118 However, before an accused person can occur JCE 3 liability, he 
must be shown to have possessed “the intention to participate in and further the 
criminal activity or the criminal purpose of a group.”1239119 Therefore, both JCE 
1 and JCE 3 require the existence of a common criminal purpose which must be 
shared by the members of the JCE, including in particular the accused.1240120 
Where that initial requirement is met, JCE 3 liability can attach to crimes outside 
the common criminal purpose committed by members of the JCE or by non-JCE 
perpetrators used by members of the JCE if it was reasonably foreseeable to the 
accused that a crime outside the common criminal purpose might be perpetrated 
by other members of the group in the execution of the common criminal purpose 
and that the accused willingly took that risk (dolus eventualis).1241121 
485. The Trial Chamber deÞ ned the Common Criminal Purpose of the JCE as 
consisting of the objective to gain and exercise political power and control over 
the territory of Sierra Leone, in particular the diamond mining areas, and the 
crimes as charged under Counts 1 to 14 as the means of achieving that objec-
tive.1252122 The Trial Chamber further found that Gbao was a “participant” in 
the JCE.1253123 The Appeals Chamber, Justices Winter and Fisher dissenting, 
considers that in consequence Gbao, as with the other participants of the JCE, 
would be liable for all crimes which were a natural and foreseeable consequence 
of putting into effect that criminal purpose.”
Consequently we can conclude with two other dissenters the author applauds 
to: 
Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao (Appeal Judgement), SCSL-04-15-A 
(26 October 2009), Partially Dissenting and Concurring Opinion of Justice 
Shireen Avis Fisher, paras 17-19, 26, 44-45 (President Judge Winter insofar 
concurring)
“17. In afÞ rming Gbao’s convictions under JCE, the Majority adopts the Trial 
Chamber’s circular reasoning, but compounds the Trial Chamber’s error by col-
lapsing the distinction between JCE 1 and JCE 3. The Majority reasons that it 
117  See e.g., Stakiþ Appeal Judgment, para. 87.
118  See e.g., KvoĀka et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 83.
119  Tadiþ Appeal Judgment, para. 228.
120  See e.g. Stakiþ Appeal Judgment, paras 85, 86 (establishing that a common criminal purpose 
existed and that the accused shared its intent and participated in it, before moving on to assess 
whether the accused could be held liable under JCE 3 for “crimes beyond the scope of that enter-
prise”).
121  Brāanin Appeal Judgement, para 365; Stakiþ Appeal Judgment, para. 87; Tadiþ Appeal Judg-
ment, para. 228; KvoĀka et al. Appeal Judgment, para. 83. The Appeals Chamber recalls that it is 
not decisive whether these fellow JCE members carried out the actus reus of the crimes themselves 
or used principal perpetrators who did not share the common purpose. See supra, paras. 393-455.
122  Trial Judgment, paras 1979-1985; see supra, para. 305
123  Trial Judgment, para. 1990.
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was sufÞ cient for the Trial Chamber to conclude that Gbao was a “participant” 
in the JCE and therefore shared the Common Criminal Purpose.27124 By vir-
tue of that conclusion, the Majority reasons, he is responsible for all crimes by 
members of the JCE that either he intended or were reasonably foreseeable.28125 
Therefore, according to the Majority’s reasoning, it matters not whether Gbao 
intended the crimes in Bo, Kenema and Kono;29126 given that he was “a member 
of the JCE,” he was liable for the commission of “the crimes in Bo, Kenema and 
Kono Districts, which were within the Common Criminal Purpose,” so long as 
it was “reasonably foreseeable that some of the members of the JCE or persons 
under their control would commit crimes.”30127
18. This reasoning is not only circular, but dangerous. First, describing Gbao as 
a “participant” under this theory is mistaken because whether or not he was a 
“participant” is only signiÞ cant if it means that he shared the common intent of 
the JCE, that is, the Common Criminal Purpose. The Trial Chamber’s Þ ndings, 
unquestioned, and indeed quoted by the Majority, state unequivocally that he did 
not.31128
19. Second, the Majority collapses the distinction between the mens rea required 
for JCE 1 and the mens rea applicable to JCE 3 by holding that Gbao can be li-
able for crimes within the Common Criminal Purpose that he did not intend and 
that were only reasonably foreseeable to him. Such an extension of JCE liability 
blatantly violates the principle nullum crimen sine lege because it imposes crimi-
nal responsibility without legal support in customary international law applica-
ble at the time of the commission of the offence. The Majority makes no effort 
to reason why it considers that this extension of JCE liability was part of the law 
to which Gbao was subject at the time these offences were committed and it fails 
to cite a single case in which this extension of liability is recognized as part of 
customary international law. This dearth of jurisprudential support was acknowl-
edged by the Prosecution which admitted at the Appeal Hearing that there “may 
be no authority” in international criminal law in which the mens rea element for 
JCE is characterized or applied as the Trial Chamber applied it to Gbao.32129“
“26. The Trial Chamber’s error with respect to Gbao’s mens rea is not simply a 
harmless mistake that can be rectiÞ ed or overlooked on appeal. Rather, because 
of this error, the entire legal ediÞ ce the Trial Chamber and Majority have con-
structed for Gbao’s JCE liability is so fundamentally ß awed that those convic-
tions which rest upon it collapse.” 
124  Appeal Judgment, paras 486, 492.
125  Appeal Judgment, paras 485, 492.
126  Appeal Judgment, paras 492, 493.
127  Appeal Judgment, para. 493.
128  Appeal Judgment, paras 488-491.
129  Footnote omitted.
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“ 44. In concluding, I am obliged to note that the doctrine of JCE, since its articu-
lation by the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadiþ, has drawn criticism for its poten-
tially overreaching application. International criminal tribunals must take such 
warnings seriously,59130 and ensure that the strictly construed legal elements of 
JCE are consistently applied60131 to safeguard against JCE being overreaching or 
lapsing into guilt by association.61132
45. For Gbao, the Trial Chamber and the Majority have abandoned the safe-
guards laid down by other tribunals as reß ective of customary international law. 
As a result, Gbao stands convicted of committing crimes which he did not intend, 
to which he did not signiÞ cantly contribute, and which were not a reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of the crimes he did intend. The Majority’s decision to 
uphold these convictions is regrettable. I can only hope that the primary signiÞ -
cance of that decision will be as a reminder of the burden resting on triers of fact 
applying JCE, and as a warning of the unfortunate consequences that ensue when 
they fail to carry that burden.”
2) Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)
On 20 May 2010 the intense debate on the applicability of the doctrine of Joint 
Criminal Enterprise (JCE)133,134) before the ECCC135 found an interim result in 
a Þ rst decision rendered by the Pre-Trial Chamber.136 This decision is admirable 
in its thorough analysis of some post WW II decisions. In the view of the ECCC 
Pre-Trial Chamber JCE III was not recognized as a form of responsibility appli-
cable to violations of international humanitarian law at the time relevant to the 
case before it and thus not to be applied by the court in regard to international 
crimes.137 It bases this Þ nding on a critical scrutiny of the authorities relied upon 
130  See e.g. Brāanin Appeal Judgment, para. 426; Krajišnik Appeal Judgment, paras 657-659, 
670, 671; Krajišnik Appeal Judgment, Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen; Milutinoviþ et 
al. Decision on Jurisdiction- JCE, paras 24-26; Rwamakuba JCE Decision.
131  Krajišnik Appeal Judgment, para. 671.
132  Brāanin Appeal Judgment, paras 426-431.
133  An abbreviation not intended to mean “Just Convict Everyone” as interpreted by some schol-
ars. Cf. e.g. Badar, M. E. „Just Convict Everyone!“ – Joint Perpetration: From Tadiþ to Stakiþ and 
Back Again, 6 International Criminal Law Review (2006), pp.293 et seq., quoting the father of the 
cynical remark, Bill Schabas.
134  Cf. e.g. Badar, M. E. „Just Convict Everyone!“ – Joint Perpetration: From Tadiþ to Stakiþ and 
Back Again, 6 International Criminal Law Review (2006), pp.293 et seq., quoting Bill Schabas
135  Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.
136  ECCC/Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on the Appeals against the Co-Investigative Judges Order 
on Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE), Case File No: 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (20 May 2010) 
[ECCC Decision].
137  ECCC Decision, supra n. 4, para. 77.
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by ICTY138 in Tadiþ139, the mother judgement on JCE in international criminal 
law. Firstly, the Pre-Trial Chamber Þ nds no support for the existence of JCE 
III as customary international law in the international instruments referred to in 
Tadiþ.140 As to the international case law, the Pre-Trial Chamber refuses to rely 
upon cases such as Borkum Island and Essen Lynching as these lacked reasoned 
judgements.141 The national case law relied upon in Tadiþ in turn is, in the view 
of the Pre-Trial Chamber, not to be considered as representing proper precedents 
for the purpose of determining the status of customary law as these do not amount 
to international case law.142 Moreover, the Pre-Trial Chamber, while turning to 
consider the possible existence of general principals of law in support of JCE III, 
takes the view that it did not need to decide whether a number of national sys-
tems representative of the world’s major legal systems recognised a standard of 
mens rea analogous to the one in JCE III as it was not satisÞ ed that such liability 
was foreseeable to the charged persons in 1975-1979.143 In such circumstances, 
the Pre-Trial Chamber correctly and unanimously concludes, “the principle of 
legality requires the ECCC to refrain from relying on the extended form of JCE 
in its proceedings.”144 In a later decisions of the ECCC this approach and the de-
tailed analysis of post WW II jurisprudence was upheld and even Þ ne-tuned.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise has its origin in the Þ rst judgment ever 
handed down by an Appeal Chamber of an independent impartial international 
criminal court not established by the winners of a war. The authors apparently 
were eager to set the tone and the standard for a not yet existing general part of 
international crimes. However, neither legally nor factually it was necessary to 
depart from the strict wording of the ICTY-Statute. The Tadiþ-case as such did 
not call for this academic exercise. The intent, no doubt, was good. The goal was 
to develop a catch all mode of liability abolishing “impunity” in macro-criminal-
ity in humanitarian law during times of an armed conß ict based on customary 
international law for the time to come. Something for eternity. In doing so and 
writing obiter at length the judges went beyond their mandate in the case before 
them. They did not show the necessary self-restraint. Customary international 
law and the need to observe, in the framework of Article 15 ICCPR, the principle 
138  International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
139  Prosecutor v. Tadiþ (Appeal Judgment) IT-94-1 (15 July 1999).
140  ECCC Decision, supra n. 4, para. 78.
141  ECCC Decision, supra n. 4, para. 79-81.
142  ECCC Decision, supra n. 4, para. 82.
143  ECCC Decision, supra n. 4, para. 87.
144  ECCC Decision, supra n. 4, para. 87.
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of nullum crimen sine lege stricta is like cat and dog. There is the wishful think-
ing145 that something “must be punishable”, a phrase often heard in legal discus-
sions, and the limitation of both, the wording of binding statutory law, and the 
dictate not to create retroactively new criminal law. The baby JCE was born. It 
was and is under the permanent control of the parents, judges of ICTY and ICTR. 
I am convinced that until today’s date no harm was done to any perpetrator be-
fore ICTY/ICTR due to the application of the JCE doctrine. On the contrary, as 
shown above, based on JCE the criminal conduct of a perpetrator was trivialized 
in a few cases from committing to aiding and abetting, sometimes (Seromba) 
corrected by the Appeals Chamber. The Appeals Chambers of ICTY/ICTR main-
tained control over the act (Tatherrschaft) in that the majority of judges were ea-
ger to maintain this doctrine, always prepared to adjust the doctrine to the needs 
of a concrete case. However, some jurisprudence hybrid tribunals show that a 
child grows and becomes independent from parental control. The foreseeable 
and predicted risk emanating from the vagueness of the third category of JCE has 
found its realization at least in part in the Þ nal conviction of the accused Gboa 
before the SC/SL has convincingly shown by the dissenting judges. This may 
never happen again. The lesson to be learned is that judges should never yield to 
the temptation to act as kind of legislator and when only developing the law with 
legitimate “judicial creativity” they must act with the highest degree of scrutiny 
always envisaging: what can be in a worst case scenario the result, how can an 
exaggerated interpretation or application be avoided when a doctrine is no longer 
subject to own control. We should applaud the mothers and fathers of the Rome-
Statute. It shows that a well drafted general part of a code of criminal procedure 
(with the sufÞ cient time, which was not available for the skeleton Statutes of 
ICTY and later ICTR) is able to meet the challenges of today’s macro criminal-
ity. At the end of the day the strict modes of liability and responsibility as laid 
down there and carefully applied by the acting judges will be the only surviv-
ing account in International Criminal Law, immaterial of how they are labelled: 
Perpetratorship in all its variants or, superß uous but exactly encompassing the 
same, JCE I or II. No doubt international criminal law will prevail based on a 
humble, patient but self-conÞ dent step by step approach taking also respectfully 
into account the individual speciÞ cities of the area of responsibility, if only they 
do not militate against the common goal: to achieve peace by justice and to try 
to achieve justice by Þ nding the truth as far as possible. There is no truth without 
justice, no justice without truth! And, Þ nally, there will be no peace, if, by way of 
neo-colonialism, a new judicial system and new substantive law will be imposed 
by whomsoever against the will of the democratically elected legislator. 
145  Simma, B./Alston, P. in this context refer to a quote by John Humphrey who observed that “hu-
man rights lawyers are notoriously wishful thinkers.“ Simma, B./Alston, P., The Sources of Human 
Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 Aust. YBIL 82 (84) (1988-1989).
